AFGHANISTAN: CAN WE SOLVE IT?

Progress is being made,'' he said. We see a profoundly changed situation in Afghanistan.'' Then the influential Atlantic Council think tank came out with a different assessment. Make no mistake, Nato is not winning in Afghanistan,'' its report said. Unless this reality is understood, and action is taken promptly, the future of Afghanistan is bleak.'' Between the two extremes the truth will be found. But what's clear is that almost six years after the West intervened to oust the Taliban, many problems have yet to be solved. The Afghan Government and Internal Stability

In common with most recent Afghan leaders, President Hamid Karzai has to spend a lot of time watching his back. His US patrons are still wary of his loyalties and feel he has never lost the sympathies he entertained for the Taliban in the 1990s. At the same time, many Afghans believe he is little more than a US puppet.

More than any other factor, that latter belief spurred Karzai to block the appointment of Lord Ashdown as the UN's so-called super-envoy'' to Afghanistan. It was not that the Afghan president doubted his abilities: Ashdown, a former royal marine, had fulfilled a similar function in the Balkans and, according to UN sources, is thought to be on top of the game as far as Afghanistan is concerned''.

Coming at the same time as Karzai's criticism of the British military effort in the Helmand province, the rejection has been seen as a snub in London, especially in the army community. Senior commanders point out that 87 British soldiers have been killed in action and that the intervention in the province has been largely successful.

However, if the issue is seen through Afghan eyes it becomes easier to understand Karzai's position. There was a perception that Ashdown was being foisted on his country - the peer was seen as a colonial viceroy - and Karzai was determined to prove that he was own man. It is also fair to say his comments will chime with fellow Afghans, who regard the Nato intervention as contributing to the country's problems, rather than resolving them.

Meanwhile, Western diplomats are agreed that there will not be any progress until a super-envoy is appointed and a formal memorandum of understanding is signed between the UN and Nato. Nato and Military Intervention

IT has long been recognised that only four Nato countries (plus Australia) are bearing the brunt of combat operations in Afghanistan - Britain, Canada, the Netherlands and the US. When the US defence secretary, Robert Gates, made what officials called an unusually stern'' plea on Friday for Germany to contribute more troops to Nato he was knocking at a closed door. Germany's defence minister, Franz Josef Jung, responded with an equally curt rejection, telling Gates there would be no increase in the current contribution of 3200 and that they would remain in the north. The only reason there are German forces in the country at all is that they operate to special rules'', which forbid combat operations.

Every senior Nato commander recognises that it is make or break'' time in Afghanistan, but finding the will and the wherewithal to finish the job will not be an easy task. The main problem is that most of the Nato armies simply lack the training and expertise to fight a counter-insurgency war of the kind that is being waged in Helmand.

The dilemma facing Nato was put into sharp focus by Canada's prime minister Stephen Harper, who warned he would remove his country's 2500 troops unless fellow Nato members pulled their weight. It is a serious threat: even with Britain's 7200 soldiers and the US's 15,100 (plus 3000 more on the way) Canadian withdrawal would make a big hole in Nato's capabilities. NGOS and Reconstruction

THERE is still a desperate need to co-ordinate the West's military intervention - the Nato-led International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) - with the work being done by the civilian non-governmental organisations (NGOs). There is a widespread understanding that both benefit from expert civilian input, especially in the vital work being undertaken by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), but there are problems in safeguarding the security of civilian workers. Last year, the US State Department had to cut back on its activities as it was unable to find employees for 600 civilian posts and the responsibility was passed to the Department of Defence.

The problem of finding and then protecting a civilian workforce has led to calls for the creation of a co-ordinating body, perhaps run by the proposed UN super-envoy. Getting the balance right is all-important. Problems on the ground are easily magnified and quickly complicated.

Sometimes NGOs need military support, but if an aid team arrives with heavily armoured vehicles in tow they are perceived as being part of the security forces. As a result, Isaf has been forced to take on tasks normally carried out by NGOs and this has led to further complications.

In a recent research paper, Kate Clouston, an associate of the Royal United Services Institute, argued that the army and NGOs do not always share the same perspectives. She wrote: A military solution to food shortages might be to drop packets of food into a field. However, the field could be mined or the food might not be within the nutritional requirements or could need refrigeration in an area where most people do not have refrigerators.'' The Taliban and Insurrection

Capturing the key town of Musa Qaleh was a feather in the cap for the British Army's 52 Infantry Brigade. Its commander, Brigadier Andrew Mackay, was justified when he claimed: Clearly the retaking of Musa Qaleh has quite substantially altered how we can view Helmand and it's really a question of squeezing this insurgency to limit its effect throughout Helmand.'' However, one battle won does not signify an end to the war, and already it has become clear that the Taliban is regrouping for the new campaigning season, which will begin in early summer. Driven by a common desire to eject Isaf soldiers, over the years they have built up a formidable bank of experience in low-intensity operations. In this respect they have been helped by the fact they can afford to pay their fighters well by Afghan standards and have substantial arsenals.

There has also been a worrying trend towards suicide bombings. Until recently, these were unknown in Afghanistan but last week, a bomber blew himself up in Helmand's capital Lashkar Gah, killing seven Afghans, including the deputy provincial governor Pir Mohammed. Coupled with the bombing of an Afghan army bus in Kabul earlier that day, there's a growing belief that Isaf is unable to contain the threat posed by Taliban fighters. The Poppy Harvest

The country's opium trade remains at the heart of all Isaf attempts to create security in the country. Although 24 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces are officially free of poppy growth, the lack of viable security in Helmand allows the plants to be grown in large fields where Taliban supporters can cultivate it freely, often under the protection of local warlords.

The US line is that these fields must be destroyed and the cultivators punished as criminals, not least because they are often also responsible for attacking and killing Isaf troops.

However, it is also recognised that destruction of the poppy crops causes local resentment. Farmers asked to comply with the policy fear Taliban retribution and their nerves have not been calmed by the failure to inflict a decisive defeat on the Taliban.

A British Isaf officer put it into context when he said the common response from local farmers was: I'll destroy the crop but you'll have to offer me protection. How long are you going to be here to do that?'' In the view of some Western diplomats and military commanders, the answer to that qustion is: around 30 years.